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THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SANCTIONS  
ON THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY 
 
Abstract: 
This paper assesses the impact of the EU and NATO sanctions on the 
Russian economy. An examination of the data revealed that the sanctions 
have directly impacted on various sectors of the Russian economy. Notable 
among them were the financial sector which includes the banks, major pub-
licly owned companies in the fuel/energy sector as well as the military and 
technological equipment. These sanctions severely constrained these sec-
tors as they struggled with lack of funding and investment.  The economy 
also witnessed huge capital flight or outflow at an estimated value of 
$7.8bn, which was further compounded by gross negative capital inflow in 
the form of FDI’s (foreign direct investments). In addition to that, the em-
bargo on food imports as well as trade sanctions led to a rise in inflation 
which further resulted to a rise in commodity prices and by extension loss 
of confidence in the falling Ruble. The sanctions also led to erratic trade 
flows and loss of market share. On the contrary, despite the sanctions the 
Russian economy moved to 45th place in the global competitiveness re-
port. Besides the Russian government continuously offer support to its fi-
nancial institutions in the form of low interest loans which led to their 
buoyancy. 
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1. Introduction 
Trade is the backbone of every economy, Countries trade in various spheres 
to satisfy various economic needs. As the saying goes” No one is an Island” i.e. 
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No Country stands alone, to which Russia is not an exception. Russia trade with 
most of the Countries in the world and that has a positive influence on the total 
performance of the Economy. 
As stated by Focus economics “The Russian economy eked out unexpected 
growth in the last quarter of 2014, demonstrating resilience in the face of geopolit-
ical headwinds, International sanctions, a falling ruble and lower oil prices.” 
When Russia annexed Crimea and started interfering in Eastern Ukraine, the 
West responded with economic sanctions. In July 2014, sanctions were enacted in 
a coordinated manner by the European Union, the United States, Canada, and 
other Allies and partners. 
 
The sanctions targeted three most important areas in the Russian economy: 
Restriction of access to Western financial markets and services for designat-
ed Russian state-owned enterprises in the banking, energy, and defense sectors. 
 Embargo on exports to Russia of designated high-technology oil exploration 
and      production equipment.  
     
Embargo on exports to Russia of designated military and dual-use goods. 
The sanctions on access to financing forced the Russian State to use part of 
its foreign exchange reserves to shore up the sanctioned entities. These develop-
ments forced the Central Bank of Russia, which abruptly ceased to defend the 
value of the Ruble and hike interest rates in December 2014. In December 2015, 
the Ruble reached its lowest and it was very tragic for the economy. 
There was a high food price due to the embargo on the import from Euro-
pean countries, which subsequently resulted to the skyrocketing of inflation. 
 
1.1. Research Questions: 
1. What is the economic effect of the EU and NATO trade sanctions? 
2. The effect of the sanctions on the Global Competitiveness of the Russian 
Economy. 
1.2 Research Purpose: 
This research is conducted to measure the impact of the EU and NATO 
sanctions and the response of the Russian government in mitigating its full impact. 
This research is not a conclusive one as it aims to shed light on some of the effects 
of the sanctions on the Russian economy.  
1.3 Research Objectives:  
The following objectives highlighted below would guide this research: 
To evaluate the economic effect of the EU and NATO trade sanctions on 
the Russian Economy 
To evaluate the effect of the sanctions on the Global Competitiveness of the Rus-
sian Economy. 
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2. Theoretical Review 
2.1 Overview of the Russian Economy 
The EU’s foreign policy instruments are limited to ‘soft power’. This is the 
main reason why the EU’s reaction to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its sub-
sequent military intervention in Eastern Ukraine consisted primarily of the imposi-
tion of economic sanctions (Daniel Gros & Federica Mustilli, 2015). However, 
this act of imposing targeted sanctions by the EU on Russia was subsequently met 
by counter sanctions from Russia. They decided to ban the importation of certain 
perishable commodities like (fish, meat and vegetables) from countries that sub-
scribe and support the sanctions of the EU. 
The Russian economy has undergone major changes since the collapse of the 
USSR, which saw its economy transforming from a centrally planned/communist 
type to a more market oriented type. Economic growth over the years has been 
moving on a snail’s pace which prompted the government to push for reforms in 
certain key aspects of the economy, in a bid to drive growth. Economic reforms in 
the 1990s privatized most industry, with notable exceptions in the energy, trans-
portation, banking and defense-related sectors.  
Russia is one of the world’s leading producers of oil and natural gas, metals 
which includes steel and Aluminum. After a turbulent political and economic tran-
sition in the 1990s, Russia experienced over a decade of high and almost uninter-
rupted economic growth, driven largely by a super cycle commodity boom, partic-
ularly historically high oil prices (The World Bank, 2016).  Meanwhile it suffers 
from the continuous fluctuations of prices of commodities as it relies heavily on 
commodity exports thereby experiencing volatile swings in global prices.    
However, the economy which had grown on an average of 7% within the 
years of 1998-2008 was highly credited to the rapid increase in oil prices, which 
later culminated in diminishing growth rates as a result of the exhaustion of the 
commodity-based growth model. Furthermore, a combination of falling oil prices, 
international sanctions and structural limitations pushed Russia into a deep reces-
sion in 2015 with GDP dropping by almost 4%. According to most economics, 
this trend is expected to continue through 2016.  However, the Russian economy 
pulled off an unexpected growth in the last quarter of 2014, thereby showcasing 
resilience in the face of the ever changing geopolitical landscape as well as interna-
tional sanctions, a rapidly depreciating Ruble and falling oil prices. However, the 
start of 2015 has brought signs of contraction as negative growth momentum has 
been picking up speed. According to focus economics report 2015, the deteriora-
tion of the economy and lower tax intake from the hydrocarbons industry, the 
Finance Ministry presented new fiscal projections for this year which indicates a 
fiscal deficit of3.8% of GDP. Although the Russian Ministry of Economic Devel-
opment is forecasting a modest growth of 0.7% for 2016 as a whole, the Central 
Bank of Russia (CBR) is more pessimistic and expects the recovery to begin later 
in the year and a decline of 0.5% to 1.0% for the full year.  
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2.2 Evaluating the Impact of Sanctions 
According to Evsey G. & Ilya P (2015) the sanctions were mostly directed at 
banks such as (Sberbank,VTB, Gazprombank, Rosselkhozbank, Vneshekonombank, 
Bank of Moscow) and major publicly owned companies in the fuel/energy sector 
(Rosneft, Transneft, Gazpromneft) and in the military-industrial complex 
(Uralvagonzavod, Oboronprom, OAC e.t.c.) This is evidenced by their decreasing 
financial and competitive performance. The prevalence of the financial effects of the 
sanctions during the first years, resulting in reduced investment and consumption, is 
manifested in the works of (Sinyakov et al., 2015 & Shirov et al., 2015). 
Meanwhile, Ulyukaev and Mau (2015) identified the main channels affected 
by the sanctions. Their classification was based on the following components: 
Increasing uncertainty (beginning even before the sectoral sanctions were in-
troduced) slows down consumption due to rising precautionary savings (often in 
USD) and dwindling investments due to higher risk premiums; 
Increased cost of debt financing limits access to refinancing, thereby affect-
ing investment opportunities for companies. Moreover, restrictions on technology 
exports to the Russian Federation constrained the potential growth of total factor 
productivity; and 
Production in sectors dependent on imported components suffers from the 
ruble’s sharp fall. 
The effect of the sanctions has serious impact on the economy of Russia. 
According to the Bank of Russia, during the second half of 2014, the foreign debt 
of the banking and non-financial sectors decreased by USD 83.6 billion and that 
of banks and companies that were more than 50% publicly owned fell by USD 
41.1 billion (without considering liabilities to direct investors) (Evsey et al. (2015). 
Furthermore Evsey et al. (2015) argued that the capital outflow from the public 
sector broke a record during the first quarter of 2015(-USD 7.8billion); in this 
case, however a significant contribution was made by the downgrading of Russia’s 
sovereign rating, which was likely to have automatically led to sales of securities by 
many institutional investors. 
According to a World Bank Report, in the first quarter of 2014, growth sank 
to 0.9% from a value of 2.0% in the last quarter of 2013 and maintained that posi-
tion for the rest of the year. The rapidly deteriorating economic situation of Russia 
is manifested in its level of inflation.  
 
2.2.1 Types and the nature of sanctions 
The sanctions were initially put in place by the EU and the US in reaction to Rus-
sia’s annexation of Crimea. The sanctions were categorized into three levels such as: 
Tier 1 and 2 sanctions (Asset freezes and visa bans)- the West agreed to 
freeze assets and impose travel bans on some Russian officials, pro-Russian militia 
as well as a ban on doing business with organizations or companies that were 
complicit in the Russian annexation of Crimea. Meanwhile, these restrictions came 
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into force in March 17th, 2014 and were extended all the way to September 2015. 
On December 20th, the EU banned European investment in Crimea and by ex-
tension providing financial and other assistance to Crimean companies. 
Tier 3 sanctions (Economic sanctions)- following the aftermath of the shoot-
ing down of flight MH17 on July 31st, the EU again imposed another round of 
sanctions targeting four areas which includes; restrictions on lending to Russian 
state banks, an arms embargo, an export ban on oil technology and services that 
could be used for Arctic or deep-sea drilling, or shale oil projects and export ban 
on dual-use goods. These include equipment such as special computers or heavy 
engineering vehicles that could be used for military purposes. The sanctions also 
included limited access to primary and secondary capital markets in the EU (Rus-
sian financial Institutions, Energy and Defense). 
However, Russia also responded to the EU sanctions putting in place coun-
ter sanctions which include a ban on the importation of food. The government of 
Russia imposed a one-year ban on the import of a long list of Agricultural produce 
from Western Countries, including fruit, vegetables, flowers, fish, meat and 
cheese. However, baby food was exempted. 
 
3. Inflation 
One negative impact of a falling Ruble was inflation. Food prices in Russia 
have increased dramatically over recent months as a result of the counter sanctions 
on food imports that were imposed on August 2014. This definitely lowered the 
real incomes of households thereby reducing their purchasing power. To this ef-
fect, spending less on Russian goods is affecting the economy. According to Bond 
et al. [2015] the effect of the falling Ruble is also felt on interest rates. In an at-
tempt to stabilize the currency, the Bank of Russia raised its key rate to 17%. With 
non-food inflation at 9%, that means that real interest rates are high at around 8%, 
which is depressing consumption and investment.  
 
 
Source: Federal State Statistics service (Rosstat). 
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Based on the information in the graph, the embargo on food import and 
other trade restrictions cause a rise in inflation, which also caused an increase in 
food prices as well as a loss of confidence in the currency of the country (Rubles). 
However, despite the monthly moderation, the inflation is expected to reach 
its peak in the second quarter this year due to effects of the ruble’s sharp deprecia-
tion and the government’s embargo on food imports from some western coun-
tries. 
According to the Russian Finance Ministry’s expectation concerning infla-
tion, it will reach a peak of more 17% in the first half of this year before reducing 
in the second half. The Ministry projected that inflation will fall below 12.0% by 
the end of 2015.  
 
3.1 Exports & Imports 
In February, Russian exports totaled USD 29.2 billion, which represented a 
19.9% contraction of the same month last year. Meanwhile, the imports equally re-
duced with a value of 35.4% annually in February, which strikes a balance between the 
two values, in comparison with a rapid contraction of 40.7% registered in January.  
Fast on the heels of a temporary recovery in February, the price of Ural oil which 
represents Russia’s main export commodity declined. At the end of March, a barrel 
was traded at USD 52.4, which was 13.3 % lower than the previous value registered in 
February. Meanwhile, despite expectations that the oil prices will remain low this year, 
the Authorities have confirmed that they will not reduce oil output. According to the 
Russian Central Bank’s economic assessment outlook, two scenarios are involved. A 
baseline scenario that indicates that the price of Ural Oils to average USD 80. In the 
worst-case scenario, the Bank sees oil prices averaging USD 60.  
          
 
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com Central Bank of Russia. 
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 3.2 Increasing External debt 
Another impact of the sanctions on the Russian Economy is the increase in 
the value of external debt. The current external debt of banks and firms stands at 
$600 billion; fallen by $130 billion over the past six months as international inves-
tors were unwilling to roll over maturing debt [Bond et al. 2015]. This shows an 
increasing trend for foreign debt which rose from 24.9 trillion to 33.8 trillion over 
the same period. Meanwhile, external debt decreased to $516.10 billion in the 3rd 
quarter of 2016 from $521.50 billion in the 2nd quarter of 2016. The external debt 
averages $444.31 billion from 2002 till 2016 thereby reaching and all time value of 
$732.80 billion in the second quarter of 2014 and a record low of $151.30 billion 
in the 4th quarter of 2002.                                       
 
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com Central Bank of Russia. 
 
4. Global Competitiveness  
The Russian Federation moved eight places up to 45th position. This is in-
deed a significant improvement bearing in mind their previous position. Albeit this 
was explained mostly by a major revision of purchasing power parity estimates by 
the IMF, which led to a 40% increase in Russia’s GDP when valued at PPP. In 
addition to that, the country improved on some market efficiency aspects, such as 
the regulatory business environment and domestic competition where they occu-
pied the 96th spot. This mirrors the Russian government’s tireless efforts to im-
prove domestic conditions for doing business as well as support financial institu-
tions with special low interest loans so as to boost their buoyancy. Meanwhile, 32 
import tariffs have been significantly reduced as an effect of Russian’s ascension 
to the World Trade Organization in 2012. 
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Source: reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report
 
Conclusion: 
Based on our findings, there are two interesting scenarios that propped up. 
Not only did the sanctions have a negative effect on the Russian Economy, it also 
led to corresponding positive effects for the economy in general. There were n
merous negative effects which reflected the implementation of the sanctions. 
However, due to specific reasons, we decided to focus on the more significant 
ones. The researchers identified the following negative effects as a result of the 
direct impact of the sanctions. They include: 
Rising inflation levels 
Decline in both exports and imports 
Increasing external debt and low foreign direct investment 
Erratic trade flows and loss of market share 
Meanwhile, apart from the negative effects of the sanctions, the Russian 
government managed to come up with counter measures which led to a mitigation 
of the full impact of the sanctions. The positive effects we identified are as fo
lows: 
The sanctions are generally assessed to have helped mitigate the macro ec
nomic challenges the Russian Economy was already facing, notably the rapid and 
pronounced fall in oil prices that started in the last months of 2014.
The Russian Federation improved eight places to 45 th position in the Glo
al Competitiveness ranking report 2016, despite the sanctions in place. This ind
cates that the Russian government through its counter sanction strategy was able 
to respond accordingly to mitigate the full impact of the sanctions.
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Recommendation: 
The pessimistic outlook of the economy compounded by weakening domes-
tic demand, weak and some redundant institutions and by extension the climate of 
uncertainty regarding future prices for mineral and natural resources, the Russian 
government needs to focus on the following steps below: 
They need to tackle and address structural weaknesses in their Institutions as 
well as ensuring their operational independence. 
To develop and promote a vibrant financial market where all the stakeholders 
or players would be free to pursue their strategies within the spirit of competition. 
To reform and reorganize the commodity market thereby increasing its effi-
ciency. 
Moreover, if the government of Russia follows the points highlighted above, 
these would indeed serve as a recipe to achieve higher prosperity, coupled with 
socio economic development beyond the current downturn, as well as other econ-
omies in the region with whom they are strongly connected. 
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